

# Abstracts

Aram Mattioli

*“To edify for fascism”. Power and Architecture in Mussolini’s Italy*

Fascist Italy was the first dictatorship to develop grand architectural ambitions and visionary urban-planning schemes. Between 1922 and 1943, the Fascists turned Italy and part of its overseas territories into one great building site. Mussolini’s regime used architecture as a permanent means of self-representation and glorification of the ‘new Italy’. Through its eager construction activity, the regime wished not only to modernise the country’s backward infrastructure and to bring it up to the latest standards of technology, but also to demonstrate the constant nature of its ability to shape and achieve powerful new visions. The Fascist regime and Italy’s architectural scene stood in a symbiotic relationship with one another.

Peter Reichel

*The difficult legacy of the Hitler regime as a ‘beautifying dictatorship’: architecture between megalomania and temporary constructions*

In order to establish a complete and comprehensible picture of the Third Reich, it is necessary to take account of and explain its janus-faced combination of force and beautiful façade. It was not possible to re-shape the broken society of the Weimar Republic, overcome class conflict, and erect a German national (Aryan) people’s community (Volksgemeinschaft) just by means of force, fear and oppression. The masses – in the first instance, the oppositional workers’ movement – needed to be mobilised and bound to the National Socialist dictatorship through measures that were attractive from both socio-political and aesthetic points of view. Along with film, radio and leisure, architecture played the most important role in this direction. Accordingly, the article focuses on the function and wide spectrum of building-construction under National Socialism.

Massimo Martignoni

*Italian memorial monuments of the inter-war period*

As part of the political cult of the dead in Italy after 1918, a number of large-scale war memorials were erected. They served to reinforce the widespread political cult of united Italy and helped a quasi-patriotic civic religion to achieve a breakthrough in Italian society. In the border areas of Trentino and South Tyrol, annexed to Italy in 1920, war memorials were a special politi-

cal issue. In their memorial projects at the start of the 1920s, architects like Giuseppe Gerola and Giorgio Wenter Marini wanted to commemorate 'all the fallen of the war'. This politics of dialogue and careful reconciliation was ended in 1926 by Mussolini's decision to erect the Victory Monument in Bozen/Bolzano, with its clearly offensive character. Colossal 'Castles of the Dead', such as at Redipuglia near Trieste (containing 100,000 dead), are further testimonies to the Fascist glorification of the 'Hero's Death'.

Harald Dunajtschik/Gerald Steinacher

*Architecture to make an 'Italian South Tyrol', 1922–1943*

Italian Fascism viewed architecture as one of the most important instruments in achieving the all-encompassing project of cultural and ethnic homogenisation, which also involved the 'penetration of South Tyrol with the Italian element'. As part of this symbolic take-over of land, a number of monuments were erected: the most significant one of its kind was the Victory Monument in Bozen/Bolzano; in the countryside, three charnel-houses built in the vicinity of the state borders stand out as an attempt to place a symbolic watch-guard on the new frontier. The centre-piece of the practical take-over of the region was the policy of settling Italians, above all in the town of Bozen/Bolzano, where a 'new city' was erected next to the old city centre from 1934 onwards, while two workers' estates were constructed on the city outskirts after 1935. Two similar kinds of settlements had been founded previously in Sinich, near Meran/Merano. The construction of major representational buildings in a number of central locations completes the overall picture.

Gustav Pfeifer

*Municipal heraldry and dictatorship: the coat-of-arms of the town of Bozen/Bolzano (1926–1943)*

More than any of the other twentieth-century dictatorships in Europe, the Fascist regime in Italy sought to appropriate not just the symbols of state sovereignty for its own ends, but also to make a visual claim on the heraldic practice of local entities (provinces and communes). At the end of 1926, the fasces lictoriae were raised to the status of official state emblem and a series of measures followed in quick succession over the next few years (in 1928, 1929 and 1933), which were designed to regulate the usage of the fasces as an integral component of public heraldry. Thereby, the fasces were also turned into a propaganda vehicle for the regime and the relevant state institutions more or less consciously made recourse to different strands of tradition. As well as emblematic elements from the period of the ancient Roman Empire, pictorial symbols from the (Italian) Late Middle Ages and also from French heraldry

– above all, from the Napoleonic era – were used. Taking fascist communal heraldry in Bozen/Bolzano as a case-study, this contribution examines in detail the attempts by contemporary officials at regulating the usage of the municipal coat-of-arms, in which traces of the Fascist influence are still visible today.

Kerstin von Lingen

*The long road towards peace: behind-the-scenes and interests at work in “Operation Sunrise”*

This article examines the political circumstances surrounding the surrender negotiations over the handover of Northern Italy, which took place in Switzerland in 1945 and were code-named “Operation Sunrise”. Following these negotiations, the German representative, SS-Colonel (Obergruppenführer) Karl Wolff, was spared from prosecution at Nuremberg. His de facto immunity appears to be the result of a unique set of personal and political interests interacting between 1945 and 1950. These shed considerable light on American wartime and post-war policy, because immunity for Karl Wolff was achieved in three phases and involved high-ranking US secret service personnel such as Allen W. Dulles, then special representative of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), based in Switzerland; his aide, Gero v. Gaevernitz; Dulles’ superior, OSS director William Donovan; Allied military commanders such as US Major-General Lyman L. Lemnitzer and British Major-General Terence S. Airey; and Swiss intermediaries such as Max Waibel from the Swiss Secret Service and his civilian aide, Max Husmann. On the basis of new evidence, it seems that the Western Allies not only failed to ensure cooperation between their respective national war crimes organizations, but for the sake of political priorities, such as the question of including Trieste within the western sphere of interest within a divided Cold War Europe, in certain cases obstructed the course of justice by withholding evidence from opposing offices, ultimately saving Wolff from prosecution.